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Abstract 
The issue of outsourcing as a form of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been 
widely discussed in the recent past. In this essay, I analyze what determines the 
outsourcing activity by looking at U. S.  manufacturing industries between 1972 
and 2002. I concentrate on correlation between the measure of outsourcing and 
wages, bargaining coverage contracts, transportation costs, and private gross fixed 
investment in information technology. My analysis finds differences in the effects 
of wages on outsourcing activity depending on the type of industry (in other 
words the industry producing durable goods versus non-durable goods). The main 
regression model finds that wages and union coverage cannot fully explain the 
colossal increase in outsourcing activity in the last three decades. Rather, the 
likely main sources of the U. S. outsourcing are foreign productivity growth and 
technological changes that allow more international specialization in the 
intermediate production stages of the final good.  
 
 
 
“The global deployment of work has its critics, but it holds huge opportunities for 
rich and poor countries alike” – Ben Edwards (The Economist - Nov. 13-19,2004 pg.1) 
 
Introduction 
 
The election year of 2004 sparked a new wave of debate on globalization. 
However, the process of globalization, or, more precisely, international trade that exploits 
comparative advantage, was already discussed back in the 19th century by David Ricardo, 
in an age when people traded grain to remote countries. More recently high-tech methods 
allow corporations to transfer various projects efficiently through computer networks. 
These networks make it easier for many corporations to offshore or outsource their 
production to countries with cheaper labor.  So, what is outsourcing, and does the 
government really need to protect America against it? Would our economy be better of 
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with competitive free markets or a closed economy? The majority of economists favor 
the former.   
In Webster’s dictionary outsourcing is defined as: “the practice of subcontracting 
manufacturing work to outside and especially foreign or nonunion companies”. A recent 
“Survey of Outsourcing” in The Economist provides a proper definition of outsourcing: 
“Handing work the companies used to perform in-house to outside firms”.(2004, p. 4).  In 
his recent speech in Congress, G Mankiw said that “if services can be sourced more 
cheaply overseas than at home, it is to America’s advantage to seize that opportunity”. 
(The Economist 2004). This quote would raise the eyebrows of ordinary American 
workers, as it seems that even the government underplays the danger of losing white-
collar jobs in which Americans have had a comparative advantage.  
Yet many economists consider such a danger a myth. They consider globalization 
and its derivative outsourcing as advantage for developed and developing countries alike. 
In his speech on globalization Alan Greenspan noted: “During the past half-century, 
barriers to trade and to financial flows have generally come down, resulting in a 
significant broadening of world markets. Standards of living rise because the depreciation 
and other cash flows of industries employing older, increasingly obsolescent, 
technologies are marshaled, along with new savings, to finance the production of capital 
assets that almost always embody cutting-edge technologies” (Greenspan, Lecture, First 
Annual Stavros S. Niarchos Lecture, 2001).  One of the popular claims about outsourcing 
is that it will cause the U. S. to lose a net 3.3 million jobs by 2015. However, on closer 
scrutiny it becomes clear that this loss amounts to only 0.71 % of all cyclic job losses in 
America (Ansberry, 2003). Other economists show that the gains of trade outweigh the 
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costs, even when job dislocations are factored into account. “The Survey of Outsourcing” 
reckons that, due to outsourcing, there is a net gain in jobs, a finding that was also 
emphasized in a recent Global Insight study. 
 This intense debate calls for a deeper look at the question of what determines 
outsourcing. To do so I perform a statistical analysis of the U. S. manufacturing 
industries that suffered the biggest job losses in recent decades as these are the industries 
that are highly labor and capital intensive and thus more susceptible to outsourcing trends 
(Lipsey,1994).  
 
Background 
Manufacturing has been a troubled sector for the past several decades. In 
particular manufacturing has seen a decline in work-force as more and more labor 
intensive intermediate goods of production are being imported from countries that can 
produce those goods more cheaply. In short, U. S. manufacturing firms outsource 
intermediate stages of production by importing intermediate parts. In theory outsourcing 
activity is a kind of vertical foreign direct investment for the U. S.  firm that splits the 
manufacturing of the final good across different countries.  It is doing so by substituting 
foreign imported parts for U. S.  made intermediate parts. (Blonigen, 2001). The use of 
foreign suppliers allows for a reduction in the complexity and in the average cost of 
producing a final good, without sacrificing proximity to the initial market and overall 
productivity.  
What does such a strategy mean for U. S. manufacturing? The statistics from 
Michigan, once the nation’s capital of manufacturing, suggest some answers. Between 
 3
1970 and 2003 manufacturing employment declined from a 33% share to a 16% share of 
the job market. The decline of manufacturing jobs was absolute and not just relative: 
from 1994 to 2003 approximately 7000 manufacturing jobs disappeared (in the Michigan 
Capital Area). Only 21% of those job losses were tied to international trade1. The bar 
graph below (Fig. 1) shows the overall trend of employment patterns in the U. S.  for 
1970 and 2003.  
                              
                                                                Figure 1 
                        Source: Capital Area Manufacturing 1970 and 2003 
 
 
Yet the increase in high-technology capital investment in the manufacturing 
industry brought some positive signs as well: Worker productivity in local automobile 
plants increased from 14 vehicles per worker in 1970 to 48 vehicles per worker in 2002, 
an increase of 243%. Globalization and outsourcing brought some mixed trends in 
employment patterns in manufacturing industries. The Department of Labor Statistics 
reports that advances in technology are increasing costs of production and that, to remain 
competitive, manufacturers must emphasize education and training more than they have 
in the recent past. This report shows that, in the manufacturing industry, openness to 
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trade forces firms to seek to increase the skill levels of their employees, hence increasing 
productivity over time.  
So how much harm does outsourcing really cause in manufacturing? Various 
studies suggest that it is not very much. Domestic manufacturing investment grew in the 
1990s and the U. S. was the largest recipient of foreign investment (Navaretti & 
Venables, 2004). In the past two years, manufacturing investment by U. S.  manufactures 
in China and Mexico was only 3% of $140 billion in investment by U. S.  manufactures.  
To explain the pattern of outsourcing activity empirically is the main goal of this 
research paper. Specifically I will concentrate on finding a partial correlation between 
shares of outsourcing and wages, in order to observe how much the increase in wages 
increase the decision to outsource. Furthermore I will explore how outsourcing decisions 
are affected by union bargaining agreements as share of expenses. The vast improvement 
and development of transportation logistics also deserves attention as it reduces 
transportation costs, making it cheaper to outsource intermediate goods of production. In 
order to answer the question—If investment in high-technology capital increases 
productivity, does it also increase, the share of outsourcing?—I will look at the 
investments in IT technology to answer this question.  
To perform a detailed study on U. S. Manufacturing Industries it is necessary to 
disaggregate manufacturing into sub-industries according to SIC and NAICS 
classifications. This will give 20 sub-industries spanning the whole of U. S.  
manufacturing activity.  I can then examine each industry in five-year increments from 
1972-2002 in order to obtain the desired trends.  
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An Empirical Model 
A DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
The principal method of this paper is to examine how characteristics of the U. S.  
manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) 2  affect outsourcing of intermediate parts of 
production.  
Consider the following multivariate model: 
itititititit ITGPFCostTransCovUnionWagesalBIMAT εβββββ +++++= )_()_()_()_(Re)( 43210 (1) 
where i is the code for 2-digit SIC industry, t is a year, β represents the coefficients of 
independent variables, BIMAT is a dependent variable representing the outsourcing 
indicator, and ε is an error term that captures all other factors not explained by 
determinants included in the model. This is essentially a log-log model, as it helps to 
predict the effects of percentage changes of independent variables on share of dependent 
variable (outsourcing indicator)3. The model estimates the elasticity of the explanatory 
variable on the share of outsourcing while holding constant all other explanatory 
variables4.   
 
A DESCRIPTION OF DEPENDENT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES. 
       The Dependent Variable:  Share of Outsourcing.  It has been noted that, “because 
outsourcing involves more than just a purchase of a particular type of good or service, it 
has been difficult to measure the growth of international outsourcing” (Grossman, 
Helpman, 2002, p. 2).  Despite this potential, in order to stay empirical I will use the 
traditional approach of measuring outsourcing–examining the share of intermediate 
goods imported by the manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) from outside the United 
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States to produce a unit of a final good.  Feenstara and Hanson’s (1999) method of 
constructing the measure of outsourcing share by 2-SIC industry across years is 
particularly useful for my purpose.   
The following formula allows us to obtain this measure: 
    ∑j [input purchases of good j by industry i] *[imports of good j / consumption of good j (2) 
This formula represents a method to obtain the share of intermediate inputs used 
by the firms in a given industry.  As the above formula is the key for calculating the 
measure of outsourcing, it merits a detailed interpretation. The denominator in the last 
term of the formula is consumption. However, in this case it is equivalent to the demand 
of the good j by industry i. Demand is equal to the shipments minus the exports plus the 
imports of the good j. This way of calculating the demand allows for the measurement of 
imported good j purchased or demanded by the industry as an intermediate good for 
production.  The numerator of the last term represents the quantity of good j that was 
imported. This value, when divided by demand  provides an import ratio of good j used 
by industry i as an intermediate input for production of one unit of the final good. In short 
to calculate the outsourcing indicator for every industry I take a particular good j–in this 
case a potential good used for manufacturing by 2-SIC industry–and multiply it by the 
import ratio. I do this for every good used by industry i, and then add all of them to 
obtain their sum, which represents the total demand for all intermediate goods. 
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 HYPOTHESIS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES. 
Wages across industries.  This explanatory variable appears as “Wageit” in 
equation (1). The primary motivation for outsourcing activity is reducing labor costs and 
splitting the intermediate stages of production between firms with narrow specialization. 
The effect of globalization increased the demand for higher skills and better training in 
the U. S.  manufacturing sector. Higher skill level increases the bargaining power of 
workers, and therefore puts upward pressure on wages. Therefore, an initial hypothesis is 
that a higher wage level will increase the share of outsourcing, as the opportunity to 
import intermediate goods reduces employment and wages formerly used for production 
of those intermediate inputs 
Union bargaining contracts.  This explanatory variable appears as “Union_Covit” 
in equation (1).  Basic macro-theory hints at the reason that this variable is important in 
the study. Unions affect the bargaining power of workers, and thus the wages . This then 
increases labor costs for firms, and encourages them to seek cheaper labor sources. The 
analysis of union bargaining agreements is especially important in the manufacturing 
sector, which is comparatively more unionized than other sectors. As reported for the 
year 2002 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 14.6% of those employed in manufacturing 
were members of a union and therefore covered by a bargaining agreement. This 
percentage is second only to that in the construction industry.  Thus, a second hypothesis 
is that the stronger the union presence in a given industry ,the more likely a firm in that 
industry will seek outsourcing as a cost-reduction measure. 
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Transportation accounts and costs of delivering a unit of a final good.  This 
explanatory variable appears in (1) as “Transport_Costit”, and captures the transportation 
costs incurred by a firm as a share of its total intermediate expenditures.  The highly 
improved transportation networks that rely on logistics systems tend to reduce the costs 
of international transportation. Sub-contracting companies deliver goods more quickly 
and reliably than the manufacturers themselves, thereby creating potential savings and 
making outsourcing more attractive. This leads to the hypothesis that reduced 
international transportation costs increase the share of outsourcing.  
Gross Private Fixed Investment in Information technology.  This explanatory 
variable appears in (1) as “GPF_ITit”. One of the major factors in increasing the level of 
productivity among workers in the manufacturing sector is undoubtedly the emergence of 
new technologies, especially information technologies, including basic computers, robots, 
communication equipment and many others. In recent decades the marginal costs of 
producing IT have dropped significantly enough that owners of manufacturing firms have 
been keen to invest in it in order to reduce costs of production by substituting machines 
for workers. It is therefore conceivable that the share of outsourcing would increase with 
the amount of investment in IT–especially in communication, where cheaper IT 
technologies have reduced production costs.  A fourth hypothesis, therefore, is that 
increasing the share of IT technology increases the share of outsourcing. 
 
Preliminary Results 
In this section I present descriptive statistics for each variable and explain some 
key points of interest related to these statistics. Also present will be the line graphs5 of 
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changes in share of outsourcing across years for three sample industries. Some 
peculiarities that merit discussion arise. Together with sample trends will appear the line 
graph of overall movement in the share of outsourcing in the manufacturing industry 
from 1972-2002, showing the bi-variate scatter plots of share of outsourcing and of each 
of the explanatory variables. Finally, the matrix of correlation for dependent and 
independent variables helps in estimating preliminary relationships and the preliminary 
economic significance of the data. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Before undertaking the regression analysis, it is important to learn all the 
statistical aspects of the dependent and independent variables of interest.  
Table 1 - Summary of Descriptive Statistics (Dependent Variable = BIMAT) 
  BIMAT WAGES Um_COV Transport_Cost GPF_IT 
 Mean 0.080 9.070 0.245 0.025 0.150
 Median 0.078 8.909 0.231 0.013 0.084
 Maximum 0.228 14.633 0.579 0.147 0.803
 Minimum 0.006 5.159 0.059 0.002 -0.088
 Std. Dev. 0.047 2.059 0.124 0.027 0.149
 Skewness 0.663 0.298 0.558 1.949 1.808
 Observations 160 160 160 160 160
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables. 
Although the mean and the median for BIMAT are close to each other, the skewing is 
rather high, indicating a lack of symmetry in the data of spread of the dependent variable. 
This skewing could be attributed to the large number of outlier companies that rely much 
more heavily on outsourcing. It might therefore be necessary to control for such outliers 
in the regression analysis. 6   The remaining determinants listed in Ttable 1 show an 
asymmetrical distribution similar to that shown in BIMAT. Wage determinant has the 
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least skewing among all other determinants. This could be attributed to the movement of 
real wages across years. Overall real wages did not increase significantly over the past 
several decades. Table 1 also presents standard deviations for every variable. In almost 
every case the variance barely exceeds 1-2% suggesting a low probability of auto-
correlation of the explanatory variables7.  
 
 
THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SHARE OF OUTSOURCING ON INDIVIDUAL 
SECTORS 
 
In order to trace outsourcing trends across years, two representative industries 
from the manufacturing sectors were chosen.  As mentioned previously, the data set on 
BIMAT suggests the presence of outliers that rely more heavily than other firms on 
outsourcing.  The manufacturing sector is divided according to the production of durable 
and non-durable goods. I pick SIC 20, and SIC 37 as two representative industries 
producing durable and non-durable goods, respectively. Figure 2 presents side-by-side 
graphs of BIMAT for SIC 20 and SIC 37 for purposes of comparison.  
             
 
Figure 2 – Line Charts of BIMAT 
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Figure 28 graphically shows the change in share of outsourcing across years for 
SIC 20 and SIC 37.  There is a visible difference in the shape of these two graphs:  SIC 
20, which represents food and kindred products, shows no clear trend as the line graph 
goes up and down throughout the years, whereas SIC 37 shows a steady, almost linear 
increase in the share of outsourcing. Part of this difference may be attributed to the fact, 
that between 1972-2002 the automobile industry, in order to produce its end product, 
steadily imported a greater share of intermediate goods than did the food industry. Even 
though there are some industries producing non-durable goods that have seen a steady 
increase in outsourcing activity (e.g., SIC 31 had an increase from 6% in 1972 to 27% in 
1997), the  data still show that, compared with non-durable goods industries, durable 
goods industries had considerably greater outsourcing activity throughout 1972-2002. 
These data suggest the plausibility of controlling for the type of industry when measuring 
outsourcing.    
 
BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS AND MATRIX OF CORRELATION 
To show the individual relationships between the measure of share of outsourcing 
and each explanatory variable, scatter plots reveal certain trends. The scatter plot in 
Figure 3 represents a relationship between the outsourcing indicator and lagged 
unionization variable. The small variance of the independent variable produces a more 
efficient estimate of the beta coefficient, and also helps us determine how “tight” the data 
is concentrated around the estimated regression line. 
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Figure 3 
 
An important observations about the scatter plot in Figure 3 merit attention.. 
Contrary to the earlier hypothesis, there is a negative relationship between percent change 
in unionization coverage and percent change in share of outsourcing.  
Table 2 shows the Matrix of Correlation between the variables in the model. The 
correlation coefficients help us predict the relationships as well as the strength of the 
relationships between variables.   
 
Table 2 - Matrix of Correlations  
 BIMAT RWH UM_COVERAGE TRANSPORATIONCOSTS CAPITAL
BIMAT 1.000 -0.230 -0.224 -0.174 0.171
RWH -0.230 1.000 0.325 0.052 0.288
UM_COVERAGE -0.224 0.325 1.000 0.553 -0.428
TRANSPORATIONCOSTS -0.174 0.052 0.553 1.000 -0.423
CAPITAL 0.171 0.288 -0.428 -0.423 1.000
 
Note that none of the correlation coefficients of BIMAT and independent 
variables are equal to zero. That is, each independent variable has a linear relationship to 
BIMAT (outsourcing indicator). Also none of the correlation coefficients between 
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independent variables is equal to 1, indicating that there is no perfect multicollinearity. 
The first column in Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients of BIMAT and its 
determinants. The coefficients for Transportation Costs and Capital predict the trends 
between BIMAT and each variable, a result in accordance with my early predictions. The 
correlation coefficient of BIMAT and Transportation Costs is negative, allowing for the 
prediction that a decrease in the cost of international transportation will result in an 
increase in the share of outsourcing.  Similarly, with an increasing share of IT 
investment, the share of outsourcing is predicted to rise. However, the results for the 
trends in real wages and union coverage seem to contradict the earlier hypothesis.   
 
PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA 
The preliminary economic significance of the data is illustrated in the following table..  
 
Table 3 - The comparative changes of dependent and independent variables 
Year BIMAT RWH UM_COV TRANS_COSTS GPF_IT 
1972 0.05 9.195 0.364 0.058 0.052 
2002 0.096 9.335 0.151 0.004 0.33 
Δchange 0.046 0.14 -0.213 -0.054 0.278 
% change 92% 1.50% -58.52% -93.10% 534.60% 
 
Table 3 reports the mean changes in respective variables from 1972 and 2002. One of the 
goals of my research was to find the economic significance of changes between BIMAT 
and its determinants. A dramatic increase in outsourcing activity over the past two 
decades–from a mere 0.05% to 0.096%, a change of 92%–brings up the question, To 
what factors can such a change be attributed?  More precisely, to what extent does the 
change in the determinants account for such an increase in outsourcing activity? 
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     Two peculiar features of Table 3 are also worthy of note.  Column 3 reports the 
change in real wages from 1972 to 2002. Real wages are the cost of labor to an employer 
adjusted for inflation. One would expect that the rise in real wage would increase the 
outsourcing activity. The real wages, however, increased very little over the past several 
decades (an increase of only 1.5%). To what extent does this small change help explain 
such a big change in the outsourcing of manufacturing?  
Labor unions are one of the strongest buffers between producers and workers in 
the manufacturing sector. Union bargaining agreements dropped a precipitous 58%. The 
hypothesis was that an increase in union strength would increase the outsourcing share, as 
firms would try to reduce additional costs of covering bargaining agreements. This leaves 
the question, of how such a big drop in the share of union coverage affects outsourcing?  
    Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 report the change in transportation costs and in 
investments in Information Technology, respectively. The tremendous decline in 
international logistics expenditures would seem to make outsourcing activities more 
attractive as the costs of transporting are minimized. The increase in IT investments 
indicates that expanding the technological infrastructure reduces the risks to production 
by allowing a firm to manage outsourcing projects from a remote location.  The 
regression analysis allows us to assess how much of the change in outsourcing share is in 
fact explained by these determinants.  
 
Regression Analysis of the Model 
A regression analysis allows us to empirically verify the hypothesized effects of 
independent variables on outsourcing and to check the robustness of the results. As noted 
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previously there is some evidence that some industries producing durable good are more 
heavily involved in outsourcing more than non-durable producers. To confirm this 
assertion I use a dummy variable, IS_DURABLE, which is equal to 1 if the industries 
produce durable goods and 0 otherwise.9  I then construct an interactive term with each 
of the determinants to determine whether the resulting coefficient indeed suggests a 
differences in wages between these two groups that would affect outsourcing.  I estimate 
the model using the following methods in turn:  OLS pooled data (1), GLS panel (2) and 
TOBIT 10 (3) estimations. To avoid bias due to omitted variables I include dummy 
variables for the time trend and for the industry effects in the estimation equation for 
OLS pooled data regression. To interpret the results, I will present a table comparing the 
actual and the predicted changes in BIMAT due to wages, union coverage, capital 
investment in information technology, and transportation costs for every SIC industry. In 
order to determine the robustness of the estimates, I cross-check the independent and 
dependent variables by constructing a BIMAT_LAG variable that allows a determination 
of whether outsourcing affects wages and union coverage.  
 
TOBIT ESTIMATION OF PANEL DATA 
The use of TOBIT allows an estimation of the model in which the dependent 
variable is bounded in value. In my base specification the dependent variable BIMAT is 
bounded between [0,1]. If the dependent variable is bounded, then the coefficient of the 
independent variable would depend on the value of the dependent variable, indicating 
that the OLS estimation is biased.  Let’s consider the estimated equation of estimation 
(1): .  ii rmsallothertelagisdrwhTBIMA ε+++−= _*0003.0326.0ˆ
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If 0<BIMAT<1 then lagisdwhi _*0003.0326.0 −>ε , where BIMAT is just greater than 
zero (lower bound). Note that the error term is negatively correlated with isdrwh_lag, 
making the coefficient downward-biased, and the OLS assumption is violated (i.e. 
corr(ε|X)≠0).  I therefore estimate the model using the TOBIT method, which uses 
estimation based on maximum likelihood  with a bounded dependent variable. 
 
Table 4 - Tobit Estimation for Panel Data Set with Random Effects (3) 
Variables Coefficient Standard Errors z-statistic Pr>|z| 
rwh_lag* -0.004 0.001 -2.68 0.007 
isdrwh_lag* 0.005 0.0007 7 0 
um_lag* -0.119 0.038 -3.12 0.002 
trans_lag* 0.416 0.127 3.29 0.001 
cap_lag 0.011 0.03 0.37 0.711 
     
     
Wald Chi2 139.72    
Log Likelihood 300.07    
n 140    
         Notes:  dependent variable is BIMAT. Random effects of error term has Guassian distribution 
and corr(ε, X) = 0 (assumed). (*) indicates the coefficient is significant at 5 percent level  
 
The coefficients of estimations in Table 4 improve upon estimation (1), correcting the 
downward bias in the OLS estimation. Moreover, out of five independent variables, only 
cap_lag remains statistically not significant. Bounding the interval of variation of BIMAT 
provides a significant improvement over estimations (1) and (2), in which only two 
variables were statistically significant. Note that the value for real wages has a negative 
sign, which persists in all estimations, but only in (3) is it statistically significant. That is, 
real wages are an important determinant of outsourcing. Most important is the coefficient 
of the second regressor, isdrwh_lag. The magnitude of the coefficient is exactly the same 
as in estimation (2). That is, when comparing durable and non-durable production 
industries, there is strong evidence that, in the former, the share of outsourcing increases 
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more consitently in response to increases in real wages (as measured against the overall 
pool of wages). 
As in estimations (1) and (2) the coefficient of union coverage is statistically 
significant and negative. In the case of the TOBIT estimation, a 1% increase in the share 
of union coverage decreases the share of outsourcing by 11.9%. Estimation (2) gives 
similar results.  
The coefficient representing transportation costs is statistically significant and has 
nearly the same magnitude as in estimation (1).  However, in estimation (2) 
transportation costs are overestimated, perhaps indicating an excessive upward bias in 
estimation (1). The coefficient of capital investment remains non-significant but 
persistently positive. The low value of the coefficient most likely arises from an error in 
measurement rather then the downward bias that I tried to correct using the TOBIT 
model. 
 
REJECTED VARIABLES. 
Trans_lag, representing transportation costs, was statistically significant in 
estimation (1), but the coefficient was over-estimated. In estimation (2) and (3) this 
coefficient drops but still remains positive, indicating that a rise in transportation costs 
increases the share of outsourcing, again opposite to my earlier predictions. Because the 
coefficient is not statistically significant, I do not consider it an important determinant of 
outsourcing. 
The same applies to investments in information technology. Even though the 
coefficient of cap_lag is positive, indicating that an increase in IT investments results in 
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an increase in outsourcing, the effect is not statistically significant and suggests an error 
in the measure of IT investments. As with transportation costs, I do not consider IT 
investments an important determinant of outsourcing11. 
  
ADMISSIBLE VARIABLES 
The last two estimations helped to strengthen the hypothesis that the relationship 
between real wages and BIMAT varies with the type of industry. The interaction term 
isdrwh_lag yields strong statistically significant coefficients in estimations (2) and (3). 
Union coverage, albeit with negative coefficients, remains significant in all (3) 
specifications. I therefore conclude that changes in real wages and in union coverage are 
important determinants of outsourcing, and thus I can proceed with interpretation of the  
results in terms of their impact on the share of outsourcing.  
 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
As already noted in a previous section, the share of outsourcing increased more 
than 90% over the past three decades (1972-2002). As the primary goal of this research is 
to find what determines the outsourcing, after performing the regression analysis I 
selected changes in real wages and in union coverage as important determinants of 
outsourcing. I now ask the questions, How much change in BIMAT is explained by 
changes, over time, in real wages and in share of union coverage, and what is the 
economic significance of such change?  
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A reverse causality estimation helps in finding answers to these questions by 
allowing us to check the robustness of the primary results. For this analysis I create a new 
independent variable BIMAT_LAG and regress first on RWH and then on UM12.  
 
Table 5 -OLS Estimation for Panel Data Set with Fixed Effects(4) 
Variables Coefficient Standard Errors t-statistic Pr>|z| 
bimat_lag 2.562 2.687 0.95 0.342 
Intercept 8.851 0.2237 39.57 0 
     
F-statistic 0.91    
R2 0.054    
n 140    
                Notes: dependent variable is rwh1982; Included are variables (not shown) of industry 
and time fixed effects. 
 
Table 5.  OLS Estimation for Panel Data Set with Fixed Effects(4) 
 
The reverse causality estimation in Table 5 shows that the share of outsourcing in 
the last period increases with the industry wage, although the effect is not statistically 
significant. This insignificance can be partly explained by the large standard error of the 
BIMAT coefficient,which arises from low variance of data on BIMAT. Yet the 
coefficient is useful in predicting that an increase in outsourcing increases wages in the 
U. S.  A similar result was obtained by Feenstra and Hanson (1999).  
I now turn to the effects of union coverage on outsourcing. 
Table 6 -OLS Estimation for Panel Data Set with Fixed Effects (5) 
Variables Coefficient Standard Errors t-statistic Pr>|z| 
bimat_lag -0.6474* 0.233 -2.78 0.006 
Intercept 0.278 0.019 14.41 0 
     
F-statistic 7.75    
R 0.039    
n 140    
                           Notes: dependent variable is UM; Included are variables (not shown) of industry and time 
fixed effects. (*) indicates the coefficient is significant at 5 percent level 
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In estimation (5) the coefficient of bimat_lag, in contrast to that in estimation (4),  
is statistically significant and thus can be interpreted with a higher degree of confidence.  
The sign of this coefficient is negative, indicating that an increase in outsourcing activity 
reduces the share of workers covered by bargaining agreements. Essentially this means 
that, over time, union strength in the manufacturing industries has lessened.13  
The reverse causality estimations support the hypothesis that real wages and 
union coverage are important determinants of outsourcing. But what is the economic 
significance of that conclusion? 
 To answer that question, I first show the marginal effects predicted by the model. 
That is, I calculate the β change in BIMAT associated with one unit change in real wages 
and in union coverage. When estimating wages, I observed the difference in overall 
effects of real wages on BIMAT compared with the effects when wages interact with a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the industry produces durable or non-durable 
goods. The interaction term produced positive coefficients in both specifications (2) and 
(3) that were statistically significant. The positive sign of this coefficient indicates a 
predicted trend of an increase in outsourcing activity when real wages increase. I 
therefore use the coefficient of the interaction term to calculate marginal effects. A 10% 
increase in real wages is estimated to increase outsourcing share by 
0.005*(.10*8.8))=0.0044 or 0.44%. Ten percent increase in share of workers covered 
under bargaining agreements is estimated to decrease outsourcing share by -119*(.10)=-
0.0119 or 1.19%.14      
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To determine the economic effects of how much change in the share of 
outsourcing is explained by changes in real wages and in union coverage, I would use the 
following formula: 
 , (3) wageWageEffect wagetypereg Δ= *)ˆ( _β
where the estimated coefficient for real wages would come from GLS (2) and TOBIT 
estimations (3)15. The last term of the equation is WageΔ .  As I am looking at the whole 
span of years under observation (1972-2002), I use the change in mean values of real 
wages for 1972 and 2002. The values of this change are in Table 3 (row 4). I use a similar 
formula for change in union coverage. Analyzing marginal effects means that only the 
explanatory power of the model is considered, whereas analyzing economic effects 
means examining the model’s predictions of how real wages and union coverage impact 
outsourcing. 
 
Table 7 - Economic effects of change in determinants on change in BIMAT 
Years ΔBIMAT ΔWage Effect ΔUnion Effect  
1972-2002 0.046 0.0007 0.023 GLS  
1972-2002 0.046 0.0007 0.025 TOBIT 
 
         In Table 7 I present the estimated economic effects using GLS – estimation (2) 
and TOBIT – estimation (3). Both estimations show almost the same values for the 
economic impact of real wages and union coverage on outsourcing activity.  The change 
in real wages explains only a tiny proportion of the increase in outsourcing activity. Put 
another way, the model’s predictions do not allow us to conclude that an increase in real 
wages is a primary cause of outsourcing, and this is even more true in predicting the 
effects in the non-durable industries.  
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The effect of union coverage seems to be stronger than that of wage. The  model 
predicts that a change over time in the share of workers’ union affiliation explains only 
2.3% of the increase in outsourcing activity in the case of GLS estimation and only 2.5% 
in the case of TOBIT estimation. Even though this change is greater than in the case of 
wages, it is still not great enough to explain the 92% increase overall in outsourcing over 
the time span.  Moreover as the reverse causality estimates show, outsourcing reduces the 
strength of labor unions over time.  
 
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR the INCREASE IN OUTSOURCING  
While many opponents of outsourcing argue that it destroys domestic jobs and 
decreases wages through manufacturers’ access to cheaper goods overall, Table 7 shows 
the opposite picture in respect to wages. Moreover, various studies provide figures 
showing that in the recent past firms that outsourced the stages of production actually 
ended up hiring more U. S. workers compared with firms that outsource less (Haveman, 
Shatz, 2004). Another important consideration is that many opponents of outsourcing 
misjudge the real cause of the decline in jobs and the decrease in wages in the 
manufacturing sector. There is evidence to suggest that this decline is mostly attributable 
to an increase in the productivity of workers and to the widespread replacement of 
workers by highly productive machinery.16 While it is true that manufacturing jobs are 
being lost, the loss is not primarily due to outsourcing activity.  
As Haveman and Shatz (2004) note the primary motive in firms that outsource are 
the savings in both direct and indirect costs, the increase in productivity, and the 
minimization of risk. My study is concerned with the first motive–direct costs. Direct 
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costs are those associated with labor costs–wages and benefits of employees, including 
union bargaining agreements, health insurance and so forth as well as the cost at all 
intermediate steps of production (bill payments for imported parts, transportation 
expenses, etc.). My  base specification includes only real wages and the share of union 
agreements. While my hypothesis was that these two determinants have the biggest 
impact on share of outsourcing, my estimations did not show that. The estimations in the 
model used here do not support the view of opponents of outsourcing who blame 
increased outsourcing activity on high wages paid to U. S. workers, which, in order to 
sustain, requires a protectionist stance in trade policy.  
As “The Survey of Outsourcing” (The Economist) reckons, one of the drivers of 
the increased outsourcing is the opportunity for manufacturers to split the production 
process into a number of small sub-divisions, each with its own narrow specialization. 
This strategy is similar to that used by Henry Ford in this first factory.  However, in 
today’s manufacturing world, the sub-divisions are remotely located in various countries 
where labor costs are low, while the parent company can still reap the benefits of its 
domestic location (i.e. closeness to customers, resources, etc).  Even when the final 
product is assembled by domestic workers, it becomes more productive to import the 
intermediate parts of production, to outsource the production of intermediate parts to 
countries like China, Mexico and other low-wage countries. While some firms move their 
production completely out of the U. S., the model used here does not consider the 
implications of such a decision. Still, we can conclude that it is not only an increase in 
wages, but the pressures for higher profits through greater productivity that perhaps 
increase outsourcing activity over time.   
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Despite that conclusion, the empirical results showing a statistical significance in 
the fact that an increase in the share of bargaining agreements decreases outsourcing 
activity is puzzling, as we might intuit just the opposite.  It is widely believed that unions 
can be a great obstacle to firms in their drive to increase productivity, by reducing 
domestic workforce or, in some cases, by partially exiting particular markets altogether 
(as is the case with GM plants in Germany, where 10,000 people—nearly a third of GM 
workforce–are slated to be cut) (The Economist,2004).  Because unions increase labor 
costs, firms will often try to avoid them by turning to outsourcing activity.  This can 
mean displacing workers that produce various intermediate parts or the final goods, or it 
can mean importing intermediate goods, assuming it is cheaper to do so. Why, then, do 
we see just opposite effect?   
I first note that a statistically significant result for the coefficient of the union 
coverage was obtained when industry effects and time trend dummy variables were added 
to my model. The time trend variable allows me to capture the decision of a 
manufacturing firm to outsource across time.. The possible explanation for the negative 
relationship between union coverage and outsourcing might be due to the increasing costs 
of unions bargaining for higher protection and compensation for workers in the event that 
they are displaced by the decision to outsource. If the costs associated with compensating 
workers for the decision to outsource is higher than the savings from the outsourcing 
project, then the firm might well choose not to pursue such a project.  Such a decision 
might then lead to a decrease in the firm’s competitiveness with rivals due to the higher 
costs of producing the final good. By avoiding outsourcing project a firm faces higher 
labor costs by staying in unionized environment. Various regulations imposed by unions 
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might pursue a firm to continue incurring such costs even if cost saving alternative exists 
because following such alternative would require breaking the union contracts that can 
result in cost greater then benefits. However  the reverse causality estimation in Table 6 
shows that the benefit of outsourcing as a way of disintegrating intermediate stages of 
production and dispersing the labor force seems to outweigh the potentially higher labor 
costs incurred through collective bargaining agreements.in case of the US manufacturing 
industries in my study.  The data also show the decline in union strength over time.  
 
Conclusion 
While the issues of globalization and outsourcing are attracting attention as our 
global economy becomes more integrated, the debate about losing jobs due to 
outsourcing is being waged with little data on the relationship between job losses and 
outsourcing. My hope is that this study contributes some of the missing data to these 
debates  In examining trends in outsourcing in the U. S. manufacturing industry, one of 
the biggest losers of labor-intensive jobs that moved overseas (especially to China) from 
1972-2002, I am interested in what factors are the greatest determinants in the decision to 
outsource. The simple linear model used in this study allows me to estimate the 
relationship between shares of outsourcing and the various determinants. The results 
show that there are differences between durable and non-durable goods industries in the 
impact that real wages have on outsourcing.  These results can serve as the basis for 
further analysis of outsourcing and associated factors.   
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Appendix 
 
Index of variables used in tables with relevant data sources: 
 
• BIMAT – broad measure of outsourcing measured as described in section 3.2 
[Sources: Input-Output Tables – BEA; Import Ratios – Linda Goldberg’s data 
set, NYU FED] 
• WAGES  - real wage measured by dividing nominal wage by CPI [Sources: 
Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates Annual 
Survey – BLS; CPI index tables – BLS] 
• UM_COV – measures share of union bargaining coverage [Source: “Union 
by sector”  - Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Trinity University] 
• TRANSPORT_COST – measures international transportation costs as share 
of intermediate expenditures by a firm [Source: Input-Output Tables – BEA] 
• GPF_IT – measures capital invested in information technology [Source: 
“Distribution of New Structures and Equipment by Using Industries” – BEA] 
 
 
Tables: 
 
Below are tables with estimation results of the base specification – equation (1) 
 
Table 1 – Estimation using OLS 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS Estimation for Pooled Data Set with Industry and Time Fixed Effects(1) 
Variables Coefficient Standard Errors t-statistic Pr>|t|   
rwh_lag -0.0005 0.034 -0.15 0.879   
isdrwh_lag 0.0003 0.005 0.07 0.946   
um_lag -0.158* 0.06 -2.61 0.01   
trans_lag 0.483* 0.18 2.68 0.008   
cap_lag -0.0001 0.3 -0.01 0.995   
       
F_statistic 32.18      
R 0.7875      
n 140      
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Table 2 – Estimation using GLS 
 
GLS Estimation for Panel Data Set with Random Effects (2) 
Variables Coefficient Standard Errors z-statistic Pr>|z| 
rwh_lag -0.003 0.002 -1.63 0.103 
isdrwh_lag 0.005* 0.001 3.51 0 
um_lag -0.109* 0.05 -2.16 0.031 
trans_lag 0.289 0.157 1.83 0.067 
cap_lag 0.028 0.036 0.78 0.434 
     
     
Wald Chi2 29.81    
R2 0.3    
n 140    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The estimates were obtained from data of Bureau of Labor Statistic with co-operation of Bureau of Labor 
Market Information and Special Initiatives of Michigan Labor Department and Growth. 
2 For this project I use the standard industry classification of 1987.  
3 It measures the share of imported intermediate goods of total demand of intermediate goods for producing 
a unit of a final good.  
4 The detailed description for each variable would be given in the next sub-section. 
5 For the purpose of this research I assume linear relationship between outsourcing indicator and its 
determinants. 
6 Section 5 would explain what I control for 
7 I refer to one of classical OLS assumptions var(ε|X)=const 
8 BIMAT on the graph denotes broad measure of outsourcing.  
9 Durable goods production is done by industries SIC 24,25 and 32-39; Non-durable goods production is 
done by industries SIC 20-23, 26-31 
10 I only thoroughly discuss TOBIT estimation as it yields most relevant results. Resulting tables for all 
regressions can be found in Appendix; The variables in tables are lagged one period for trend-specific 
observations. 
11 In some literature IT investments considered significant when looked at how it impacts wages when 
wages are the dependent variable. See R. Feenstra, G. Hanson (1999), C. Morrison (1997). That is in reality 
it is important to consider IT investments in conjunction with outsourcing. Our project came short of 
finding the relevant data that can produce statistically significant results. Similar situation applies to 
transportation costs. It’s reduction over time (see “Survey of Outsourcing”(The Economist)]) should 
significantly increase outsourcing activity.  
12 RWH = real wages with a base year 1982; UM=share of workers covered by bargaining agreement 
13 In 1973, 24% of the labor force was unionized and that proportion had fallen to 14 
percent in 1997 (Alejandra Cox Edwards,2000) 
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14 I used the following formula (β-wage effect)*(10 percent increase in real wages /union coverage) in the 
last period. The coefficients for isdrwh_lag and um_lag were taken from estimation (3). For marginal effect 
of real wages in durable production industries mean of isdrwh_lag was taken. 
15 I do not use OLS estimation (1) since it produces biased coefficients as outlined in sub-section on 
regression analysis 
16 Source: Boston Globe, on-line edition - 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2004/05/06/manufacturing_jobs_lost_at_steady_pace/ 
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